Palantir Technologies 1070/2024
FOI Reference: 1070/2024
Request:
I'm writing to you under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) to ask if you currently, or at any point in the last 5 years, have or hold a contract with the company Palantir Technologies.
I'll note for the purposes of transparency declarations under the act that this information would not be covered by National Security or law enforcement exemptions, as a recent contract with Leicestershire police has recently been made public voluntarily through the government's contracts finder website, the details of which are here below:
I'd like to know the cost if applicable, as well as the timeframe of the contract, a vague outline of the work (if this can be made available), and if this has the option to extend or not.
I'd like to know as well, if the force has met with Palantir at any point over the last two years to discuss future contracts, if so, can I have the minutes of these meetings please.
Response:
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon Section 17 of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which: a) states that fact b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and c) states (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.
Dyfed-Powys Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds information pertinent to this request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply, by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) – National Security
Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement
Sections 24 and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions and both evidence of harm and public interest considerations need to be articulated to the applicant.
Evidence of Harm
Any disclosure under FOI is a release to the public at large. Whilst not questioning the motives of the applicant, confirming or denying that information relating to covert and/or specific software and its uses would show criminals what the capacity, tactical abilities and capabilities of the force are, allowing them to target specific areas of the UK to conduct their criminal/terrorist activities. Confirming or denying the specific circumstances in which the Police Service may or may not deploy the use of covert and/or specific software would lead to an increase of harm to investigations and compromise law enforcement. This would be to the detriment of providing an efficient policing service and a failure in providing a duty of care to all members of the public.
The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006, the UK Government has published the threat level, based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently categorised as SUBSTANTIAL.
The UK continues to face a sustained threat from violent extremists and terrorists. It is well established that police forces use covert tactics and surveillance to gain intelligence in order to counteract criminal behaviour. It has been previously documented in the media that many terrorist incidents have been thwarted due to intelligence gained by these means.
Confirming or denying whether any information is or isn’t held relating to the covert and/or specific software offered by specific companies would limit operational capabilities as criminals/terrorists would gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them. It may also suggest the limitations of police capabilities in this area, which may further encourage criminal/terrorist activity by exposing potential vulnerabilities. This detrimental effect is increased if the request is made to several different law enforcement bodies. In addition to the local criminal fraternity now being better informed, those intent on organised crime throughout the UK will be able to ‘map’ where the use of certain tactics are or are not deployed. This can be useful information to those committing crimes. It would have the likelihood of identifying location-specific operations which would ultimately compromise police tactics, operations and future prosecutions as criminals could counteract the measures used against them.
Any information identifying the focus of policing activity could be used to the advantage of terrorists or criminal organisations. Information that undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both National Security and Law Enforcement.
Public Interest Test
Factors favouring Confirming or Denying for Section 24 - National Security:
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and how resources are distributed within an area of policing. To disclose the requested information would inform the general public that Dyfed Powys police allocate their resources appropriately. In the current financial climate of cuts and with the call for transparency of public spending, this would enable improved public debate into this subject.
Factors against Confirming or Denying for Section 24 - National Security:
Security measures are put in place to protect the community we serve. As evidenced within the harm, to confirm or deny whether any information is held would highlight to terrorists and individuals’ intent on carrying out criminal activity potential vulnerabilities of police capabilities within the force area.
Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity. The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regards to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain. Any incident that results from confirming or denying such information exists would, by default, affect National Security.
Factors favouring Neither Confirming or Denying for Section 31- Law Enforcement:
Confirming or denying that information exists relevant to this request would lead to a better-informed public which may encourage individuals to provide intelligence which may culminate in a reduction of crime.
Factors against Confirming or Denying for Section 31 – Law Enforcement:
Confirming or denying if this information is held would compromise the effective delivery of operational law enforcement. It would allow terrorists and individuals intent on carrying out criminal behaviour, to gain a greater understanding of the police’s methods and techniques, enabling offenders to take steps to counter them, which would hinder the prevention and detection of future crime. This would lead to more crime being committed and would undoubtedly place individuals at risk.
Balancing Test:
The points above highlight the merits of confirming or denying whether any information pertinent to this request exists. The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The Police Service will never divulge whether or not information is held if to do so would place the safety of individual(s) at risk or undermine national security.
Whilst there is a public interest in confirming or denying whether the information requested is held, there is also a very strong public interest in safeguarding national security. As much as there is a public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced in matters of national security, this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances, for which this FOI request is not.
At this moment in time, it is of our opinion that for these issues outlined above, the balance test favours neither confirming nor denying that information relevant to your request is held.
(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 10/12/24)