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FOI Reference: 824/2024
Request:
Could you please provide a figure for the total amount of Bitcoin currently held by the Dyfed-Powys Police and the total amount of Bitcoin sold by the Dyfed-Powys Police, since 26 April 2024, when sections 3C to 3F of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 came into force?
Response:
I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the information requested, however a Section 31(1)(a)(b) Law Enforcement exemption has been applied to part of the requested information thereby exempting its release.
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.
Where exemptions are relied upon section 17 of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which:
a) States that fact
b) Specifies the exemption(s) in question and
c) State (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies
Section 31(1)(a)(b) Law Enforcement:
(1) Information which is not exempt information by virtue of section 30 is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to prejudice -
(a) the prevention or detection of crime
(b) the apprehension or prosecution of offenders
Section 31 is a prejudice based qualified exemption and as such there is a requirement to provide details of the harm as well as the public interest test.
Harm in Disclosure
The Harm Test process requires Dyfed-Powys Police to consider any possible harm that might arise as a result of placing the requested information into the public domain. This process considers the potential harm to:
Policing is an information-led activity, and information assurance (which includes information security) is fundamental to how the Police Service manages the challenges faced. In order to comply with statutory requirements, the College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice for Information Assurance has been put in place to ensure the delivery of core operational policing by providing appropriate and consistent protection for the information assets of member organisations, see below link:
https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/information-management/
It is widely recognised that criminals use Cryptocurrency to take advantage from the perceived anonymity of digital assets for illicit purposes. Cryptocurrency transactions can also be for vast amounts.
It is accepted that there has been information previously released into the public domain that confirms the amount of Cryptocurrency seized under law enforcement purposes. However, a motivated actor with the right tools can use this information, using methods that map out exactly where the funds may have originated from, confirming that they have been seized and that criminality had been identified. Therefore, there exists a risk of forewarning criminals which in turn could jeopardise investigations if there are outstanding suspects or funds that have yet to be seized or restrained.
Providing information to the wider public about the volume of assets stored increases the risk of cyber-attacks, insider threat and other hostile actions by those who may wish to infiltrate either the supplier or law enforcement.
Factors favouring Disclosure - Confirming the size of seized Cryptocurrency transactions would be of interest to the public, namely give insight into the processes used to solve crimes and widen public discussion on such matters.
Factors favouring Non-Disclosure - Measures are put in place to protect the community we serve and as evidenced within the harm, to provide a size of Cryptocurrency seizures would allow individuals intent on disrupting law enforcement from targeting specific organised crime gangs, and criminality overall; using the information obtained to maximise the impact.
Taking into account the security climate within the United Kingdom, and the sensitive nature of criminal investigations, no information which may aid criminality should be disclosed. It is clear that it would have an impact on a Force’s ability to carry out the core duty of enforcing the law and serving the community.
The public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.
Balance Test - The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. Weakening the mechanisms used to investigate any type of criminal activity would have a detrimental impact on law enforcement as a whole. To provide the overall sums of Cryptocurrency seizures, despite the known risks of cyber-attacks would undermine any trust or confidence the public have in the Police Service. Therefore, at this moment in time, it is our opinion that the balance test favours against the disclosure of the information requested.
(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 19/09/2024)