Command and control IT systems 1078/2025
FOI Reference: 1078/2025
Request
I am carrying out some research into the capability of Welsh police forces in relation to command-and-control IT systems and any specific IT systems that are used to support the operational policing response to larger scale operations such as football matches, protests and festivals. I have tried to break my questions down into individual questions and into two sections, one on Command and Control and one into Operational policing.
Command and Control
1 Please can you tell me the number of control rooms you have within the constabulary?
2 Please can you tell me the maximum number of call takers you have working at any one time
3 Please can you tell me the maximum number of dispatchers you have working at any one time
4 Are the role of call taker and dispatcher totally separate or are some staff trained in both?
5 What is the IT system you use to record calls and dispatch units?
6 How long have you had this system for?
7 Are you on a fixed term contract for this system and if so, how long does that contact have left to run?
8 Do you have any intentions in replacing it or considering other options within the next 5 years?
9 What is the current annual budget for your command-and-control system?
Operational Policing
1 What Crime recording system do you currently use?
2 What is the cost of the crime recording system annually?
3 Do you have any specific software to assist in the operational planning and execution of large-scale operational events such as football matches, protests and festivals.
4 If the answer to 3 is yes please can you tell me what it is called and the annual budget to use it?
I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the requested information; however the following exemption applies to part of that information, namely Question 1:
Section 31(1)(a)(b) – Law Enforcement
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.
Where exemptions are relied upon section 17 of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which:
a) States that fact
b) Specifies the exemption(s) in question and
c) State (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies
The Section 31 exemption is a prejudice-based qualified exemption. There is therefore a requirement to carry out a HARM Test in respect of such information and there is a requirement to carry out a Public Interest Test in order to establish whether the public interest in maintaining the exemption may be outweighed by a wider public benefit in disclosure.
Evidence of Harm
Under the Act, we cannot, and do not request the motives of any application for information. We have no doubt that the vast majority of requests made under the Act are legitimate and the applicants do not have any ulterior motives. However, in disclosing information to one applicant, we are expressing a willingness to provide it to anyone in the world. This means that a disclosure to a genuinely interested and concerned person automatically opens it up for a similar disclosure, including those who would use the information to gain an advantage over our ability to exercise our core function which is Law Enforcement.
In considering whether or not this information should be disclosed, consideration has been given to the potential harm that could be caused by disclosure.
The police service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The general public are also aware that modern day policing is intelligence led and that there are changes on a day to day basis. Disclosure of the exact location of the Force Communications Center within Headquarters Dyfed-Powys Police Headquarters and any potential information in respect of the number of separate control room locations:would divulge the forces’ tactical capability in respect of this area of policing, which would cause operational harm to the Dyfed-Powys Police Force by affecting our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement.
The release of such information would be invaluable to those with criminal intent, as criminals would be able to identify force tactical capabilities and use this knowledge to their own advantage in furthering criminal activity not only within this force but also throughout the country.
I have considered the below, and I have concerns about sharing the exact location of our control rooms and their back up functions.
Public Interest Test
Considerations favouring disclosure:
Factors favouring the disclosure of this information would include better awareness regarding buildings used by Dyfed-Powys Police.
Considerations favouring non-disclosure:
Factors favouring non-disclosure would be the protection of buildings that are essential for operational resilience, security and safety. These facilities are critical and by disclosing the exact location and whether there is a back-up facility could bring the force to a standstill, and disclosing their location(s) would increase security risks and could reduce our capabilities. The key risks associated with the public knowing their exact location(s) include:
- The potential for targeted attacks or disruption: individuals could target these in order to disrupt our policing response, whether through physical attacks, protests or sabotage. Groups or individuals aiming to interrupt our policing operations, including those with hostile intent could target the controls rooms.
- Counter-terrorism vulnerability – control room(s) play a crucial role in coordinating responses to terrorism-related threats. If we disclose the exact location, it could attract those seeking to undermine our response, or cause wider public harm.
- Threats to staff safety: staff working in these facilities could face increased personal risk if hostile individuals know where they are based.
- Operational vulnerability: control room(s) are central to emergency response. Any disruption could affect the forces ability to coordinate policing and respond to incidents.
- Back up functions/sites are intended to remain discreet so operations can continue if the main site is compromised. Our back up site must remain discreet to function effectively during disruptions. If both the primary and any possible secondary locations are known, our overall resilience is weakened.
This would have an impact on police resources and would hinder the prevention or detection of crime and place individuals at risk.
Balance Test
After considering the advantages and disadvantages in disclosure it falls upon Dyfed-Powys Police to conduct a balance test on the issues. The strongest arguments for release, which is better awareness, needs to be weighed against the strongest argument for non-release, which in this case is effective law enforcement.
The police service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities we serve. The general public are also aware that modern day policing is intelligence led and that there are changes on a day to day basis. Disclosure of information in respect of police buildings connected with critical policing would cause operational harm to the Dyfed-Powys Police Force as well as potentially place officer’s safety at great risk as well as that of the general public by affecting our ability to fulfil our core function of law enforcement. The release of such information would be invaluable to those with criminal intent as criminals would be able to identify force tactical capabilities and use this knowledge to their own advantage in furthering criminal activity not only within this force but also throughout the country.
The Police Service is tasked with the prevention and detection of crime and protecting the public. Whilst there is a public interest in this subject there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the protection of the public and the effective use of police resources. Public safety is of paramount importance and the police service will not divulge information if to do so would compromise law enforcement.
Therefore, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.
Command and Control
Response Q2
There would be no set maximum amount of call handlers, but there could be anywhere between 10-20 call handling staff working depending on the circumstances/time of day etc.
Response Q3
The maximum number of dispatchers is 8-10 depending on the time of day/week/whether there are major incidents ongoing.
Response Q4
Some staff are trained in both roles of call taker and dispatcher. Others are just call handlers.
Response Q5
Call Recording – Motorola Vault
Dispatch - SopraSteria STORM
Response Q6
Call recording – November 2024
Dispatch - 1997
Response Q7
Call Recording – 8 year contract, ending November 2029. Option to extend for 3 years to November 2032.
Dispatch – 31/12/2026
Response Q8
No
Response Q9
£154,212.88
Operational Policing
Response Q1
Niche Records Management System
Response Q2
£194,355.52
Response Q3
We don’t use any specific software beyond our basic DPP systems (email, MS Teams, DMS, Word documents etc).
Response Q4
Not Applicable
It should be noted that as a result of the systems adopted by Dyfed-Powys Police in relation to the recording of such information that the information released may or may not be accurate.
(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 18/12/2025)
|
Os oes angen y wybodaeth yma arnoch yn Gymraeg, cysylltwch â: If you require this information in Welsh, please contact: |