Facial recognition technology 588/2025
FOI Reference: 588/2025
Request:
I am making this request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Please limit the scope to the period from 1 January 2022 to the date of this request.
I request the following information:
- Is your force currently using any form of facial recognition technology? If yes, please confirm whether this use began on or after 1 January 2022, and state the type(s) of deployment (e.g. Live Facial Recognition (LFR), Retrospective Facial Recognition (RFR), body-worn camera, fixed CCTV, mobile unit, traffic enforcement cameras, ANPR systems (if facial recognition-enabled) etc.).
- Which company or companies provide the facial recognition technology your force is currently using?
- Since 1 January 2022, has your force shared any facial recognition data in any form, or image-based intelligence, with any of the following:
- the State of Israel;
- any Israeli government body or agency;
- any Israeli company (including, but not limited to, those named in response to question 2, as well as private or state-affiliated entities); or
- any Israeli non-governmental organisation?
Response 1:
I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the information requested, as outlined below.
Yes. Police National Database (PND) was introduced in 2011, although I the exact date RFR was introduced is not held and it may have been available from the date of commencement. Nevertheless, I can confirm RFR was being used before 01/01/2022, via the PND.
Response 2:
I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the information requested, as outlined below.
None, PND is a national contract through the Home Office. The force does not contract with the supplier direct.
Response 3:
Dyfed-Powys Police can neither confirm nor deny, that it holds the information you have requested by virtue of the following exemptions:
S23(5) Information supplied by or concerning certain Security Bodies
S24(2) National Security
S27(4) International Relations
S31(3) Law Enforcement
Section 23 is a class-based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case.
Sections 24, 27 and 31 are qualified exemptions and as such there is a requirement to articulate the harm and conduct a test of the public interest in confirmation or denial.
Evidence of Harm:
Disclosure of the information, if held, runs the risk of undermining international relationships, that when used on its own or with other information is likely to have an undesirable effect on the national security of the states concerned and the UK
The effective conduct of international relations depends upon the maintenance of trust and confidence between states and international organisations. If the UK does not maintain this trust and confidence, its ability to protect and promote UK interests through international relations will be severely diminished. In this case, confirming or denying whether any information is held would very likely be seen as a breach of trust, which is fundamental to international relations in general. In this particular instance, is vital to the UK’s ability to continue to conduct effective relations with foreign states.
Modern day policing is intelligence led and law enforcement depends upon the development of intelligence and the gathering and security of evidence in order to disrupt criminal behaviour and bring offenders to justice. However to confirm or deny whether any information is held regarding intelligence that has been provided to overseas countries would, in this case, undermine the process of preventing or detecting crime and the apprehension of prosecution of offenders.
Public Interest Considerations
Factors favouring confirmation or denial information is held s24 National Security
We appreciate the importance of the public being informed on how public money is being spent and how public authorities conduct their activities and generate their income. Confirming whether any other information regarding intelligence sharing to international states is held would increase public confidence and allow for better informed public debate.
Factors favouring not confirming or denying information is held s24 National Security
To confirm or deny whether any other information is held risks prejudicing national security. It is not in the public interest to compromise ongoing or future operations which protect the security or infrastructure of the UK by undermining the need to use the NCND approach to such requests consistently.
Factors favouring confirmation or denial information is held s27 International Relations:
There is a clear public interest in making appropriate information available to the public. Confirmation or denial information is held would act to reinforce the commitment of Dyfed-Powys Police as an open and transparent organisation, serving to maintain public confidence in the force and the wider policing service as a whole.
Factors favouring not confirming or denying information is held s27 International Relations:
Confirming or denying information is held in this case is very likely to compromise the ability of the UK to promote and protect its interests abroad whilst also undermining the UK’s ability to form new and mutually beneficial relationships with other states. The damage that confirmation or denial is likely to cause to the UK’s international relations in this case cannot be said to be in the public interest.
Factors favouring confirmation or denial information is held s31 Law Enforcement:
Confirmation or denial information is held would lead to better public awareness identifying that the force undertake work with law enforcement agencies from across the world. This would allow greater insight into when and how public money is spent.
Factors favouring not confirming or denying information is held s31 Law Enforcement:
Confirmation or denial information is held in this case would compromise the forces’ ability to engage and assist overseas police forces in tackling international threats and share best practice within policing in the future. Confirmation or denial would confirm that countries had or had not taken a direct interest in, or been provided with assistance in a given time, which could infer the level of overseas criminal threats. The safety of the public is of paramount importance, and any increase in crime both in the UK and abroad which results in harm to the wider population cannot be considered to be in the public interest.
Balance Test:
The security of the country is of paramount importance and the Police Service will not divulge information if to do so would place the safety of the public at risk, undermine National Security or law enforcement.
Transparency in public office in respect of requests concerning the sharing of intelligence, whether domestically and abroad, would inform public debate, provide reassurance and promote confidence in the police service as a whole.
There is however a considerable risk that confirmation or denial information is held in this case would be seen by some as a breach of vital trust and confidence which would cause severe and lasting damage to UK relations with other states.
Where confirmation or denial would risk the safety of the public, prejudice the interests of the UK abroad, and further undermine the ability of the UK to protect and promote its interests abroad, it cannot be in the public interest.
Taking the above points into account the balance favours neither confirming nor denying information is held.
No inferences should be drawn as a result of this response as to whether information is or is not held.
It should be noted that as a result of the systems adopted by Dyfed-Powys Police in relation to the recording of such information that the information released may or may not be accurate.
(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 04/07/2025)
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