CHIS payments 946/2025
FOI Reference: 946/2025
Request
Please provide me with the following information relating to payments made to Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS).
1. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please a value for how much the police force has spent on CHIS, providing a breakdown for each FY
2. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please state how many CHIS authorisations were granted to the police force, providing a breakdown for each FY
3. For the financial years 21/22, 22/23, 23/24, 24/25 and 25/26 (so far) please state how much the police force has spent on CHIS related to Palestine protest groups, providing a breakdown for each FY
Response 1 & 2:
I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the information requested, however, we are withholding that information by virtue of the following exemption.
- Section 30(2) – Confidential Sources
Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.
Where exemptions are relied upon section 17 of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which:
a) States that fact
b) Specifies the exemption(s) in question and
c) State (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies
Section 30(2) is a class-based qualified exemption. This means that the legislators when writing the legislation considered that the release of such information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 would cause harm to the public authority or individual concerned. There is therefore no requirement to carry out a HARM Test in respect of such information. However, there is a requirement to carry out a Public Interest Test in order to establish whether the public interest in maintaining the exemption may be outweighed by a wider public benefit in disclosure.
Public Interest Test:
Factors favouring disclosure:
There is information within the public domain confirming that police use covert human intelligence sources to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. Disclosure would enhance the public’s knowledge about how information relating to informants is used by Dyfed-Powys police and how the intelligence received assists in day to day investigations and operations to assist the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. Disclosure would also assist in stopping any incorrect rumours or falsehoods relating to how the police store and manage how informants assist the police. It would also allow the public to determine whether the financial outlay by the force to informants is appropriate in comparison to the level of successful prosecutions.
Factors favouring non-disclosure:
Disclosure of the information requested could identify informant activity within a force area. Over a period of time if several disclosures were made, individuals could analyse the information and identify any sudden peaks or troughs in informant activity. This would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and also prejudice our ability to maintain confidential sources. Consequently, the force’s future law enforcement capabilities would be affected. Similarly, the disclosure of the information would highlight when informants have been used which could place those persons, or those suspected of being an informant, in danger. The disclosure of this information would lead to informants losing confidence in Dyfed-Powys Police and would impede the recruitment of informants in the future.
Balancing Test
There is information within the public domain confirming that police use covert human intelligence sources to assist them with investigations and the effective delivery of law enforcement. The Police Service is tasked with protecting the community we serve and solving crime and there is a public interest argument in ensuring we are open and transparent with regard to policing investigations and operations. There is no doubt that for the issues outlined above any disclosure relating to sensitive informant information would jeopardise those important roles. Informants play a vital role in assisting the police and is based very much on relationships built on trust and the expectation of complete confidentiality Dyfed-Powys police would never disclose information which would compromise our tactics or compromise the safety of an individual. It is therefore our opinion that the balance lies in favour of non-disclosure of the information.
Response 3:
Dyfed-Powys Police can Neither Confirm Nor Deny that it holds the information relevant to your requests as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) – Information Supplied By Or Concerning Certain Security Bodies:
Section 24(2) – National Security
Section 30(3) – Investigations
Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement
Section 40(5) – Personal Information
Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest. Confirming or denying the existence of whether any information is held would contravene the constrictions laid out within Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in that this stipulates a generic bar on disclosure of any information applied by, or concerning, certain Security Bodies.
Section 24 is a prejudiced based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to evidence the prejudice (harm) in disclosure and consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming or denying that information is held is appropriate.
Section 30 is a class based qualified exemption and there is a requirement to consider the public interest to ensure neither confirming or denying information is held is appropriate.
Section 31(3) being prejudiced based qualified exemption, there is a requirement for us to evidence harm in confirming or denying information is held and also consider the public interest
Section 40(5)(a)(b)(i) in this case is an absolute exemption as outlined below and as a consequence there is no requirement to carry out a public interest test as to whether neither confirming nor denying the information exists is the appropriate response.
Section 40(5) – Personal Information:
The duty to neither confirm nor deny under this section of the Act arises if confirmation as to whether the requested information is or isn’t held would breach any of the data protection principles contained within Part 3 - Chapter 2 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Under Section 34 within Chapter 2 “The Controller in relation to personal data is responsible for and must be able to demonstrate, compliance with” Chapter 2. Such information would not be confirmed as held under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 unless there is a strong public interest. One of the main differences between the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 2018 is that any information released under FOI is released into the public domain, not just the individual requesting the information and disclosure under the Act must be made with that in mind. As such, any release that identifies an individual through releasing their personal data, even third-party personal data is exempt.
Personal data is defined under Section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 as:
“(2) ‘Personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual (subject to subsection (14)(c)).
(3) ‘Identifiable living individual’ means a living individual who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to—
(a) An identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data or an online identifier, or
(b) One or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of the individual.”
All members of the public including those employed by the force have an intrinsic right to privacy and these rights are protected by virtue of the Human Rights Act, the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and a public authority must not interfere with that right. Any release of the information subject to the exemption is likely to compromise those rights.
Data Protection Act 2018
Part 3 – Law Enforcement – Chapter 2 Principles Section 35
The first data protection principle:This section has no associated Explanatory Notes
“(1) The first data protection principle is that the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes must be lawful and fair.”
General Data Protection Regulation
Article 5 of the GDPR – ‘Principles relating to processing of personal data’ provides:
“1. ‘Personal data’ shall be
(a) Processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency);
(b) Collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest…
2. The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’).”
A disclosure under Freedom of Information is a release of information to the world in general and not an individual applicant. Therefore, simply confirming or not that such information, if any, were held would disclose personal information about an individual/address. The Police Service will not confirm to the world in general whether or not information is held if to do so would disclose personal information of an individual/address.
Evidence of Harm:
There is considerable harm attributed to the confirmation or denial that any other information is held in relation to police confidential sources. Such information would not exist had Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) not been required to participate in the effective investigation of criminal matters. The information would only be held if it were obtained and recorded by the force for the purpose of its functions in relation to criminal investigations.
Any disclosure such as in this request that may reduce the flow of information to the Police Service and intelligence agencies would have a substantial prejudicial impact on the ability of such authorities to collect reliable and accurate intelligence. Furthermore, law enforcement bodies would become dependent on more costly and time consuming methods of collecting intelligence. Whilst it may not be seen by the public to be wholly acceptable to offer payments to individuals who are close to criminal activity, CHIS are often the most valuable sources of information and enable the police and other agencies to secure evidence and subsequent prosecutions.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (regardless of their motivation) provide information at particular personal risk to themselves and their families. As previous cases have shown, where a CHIS is identified it can result in substantial physical harm, or mental trauma resulting from the threat of physical harm. This problem is particularly acute in cases relating to serious crime and terrorism where the threat against individuals is substantial.
The use of CHIS is regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act which requires authorities to take into account the provisions of the Human Rights Act when using CHIS (and other covert techniques). Police forces are reminded of their obligation under Article 2 of the Human Rights Act which requires them to protect human life. This is further supported by a High Court hearing Van Colle v Chief Constable Hertfordshire Police. In this case the force concerned failed to provide adequate protection to an individual whose life was at risk because of the criminal acts of a third party. The witness was murdered by a person whom he was about to give evidence against in a criminal trial.
Those determined to identify informants have the ability to use small pieces of information in order to build a more complete picture and it is the cumulative effect of information disclosures that the Police Service feel will lead to this prejudice being realised.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (regardless of their motivation) provide information at particular personal risk to themselves and their families. As previous cases have shown, where a CHIS is identified it can result in substantial physical harm, or mental trauma resulting from the threat of physical harm. This problem is particularly acute in cases relating to serious crime and terrorism where the threat against individuals is substantial. To confirm or deny any additional information would place those individual(s), if any, at an increased risk from danger as detailed above.
It may be viewed by those not involved in the management of informants that a statistical number in itself is unlikely to cause any such adverse effects. However, the subject has to be viewed more holistically. Those determined to identify informants have the ability to use small pieces of information in order to build a more complete picture and it is the cumulative effect of information disclosures that the Police Service feel will lead to this prejudice being realised.
Confirming or denying any additional information exists could impact on the recruitment and retention of CHIS in general, due to the perception of (rather than the actual) risk of identification. In an Information Tribunal case relating to the payments made to CHIS in Croydon (EA/2010/0006), it was accepted that this argument applied as much to CHIS providing intelligence in relation to national security concerns as to CHIS engaged in countering more traditional criminal threats. In this way, the disclosure of payment information would damage national security through discouraging current national security CHIS from co-operating with the Police Service in other geographical areas, or preventing the recruitment of national security CHIS in the future - regardless of whether the area in question actually currently runs CHIS reporting on serious crime, terrorist or other threats.
Public Interest Test
Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial – Section 24(2)
The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and by confirming or denying that this information is held would allow them to see where money is being spent and know that Dyfed-Powys Police is undertaking its duty to robustly tackle any form of activity relevant to this request.The information simply relates to national security and disclosure would not actually harm it.
Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 24(2)
Confirmation of any policing arrangements of this nature would render security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infrastructure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public. To counter this, a full review of security measures would be needed and additional costs would be incurred.
By confirming or denying any policing arrangements of this nature would render national security measures less effective. This would lead to the compromise of ongoing or future operations to protect the security or infra-structure of the UK and increase the risk of harm to the public.
Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial - Section 30(3)
The confirmation or denial that information is held by Dyfed-Powys Police would provide a greater insight into policing and how resources are allocated to investigate crimes. The confirmation or denial that any other information is or is not held would identify how often Dyfed-Powys Police utilise CHIS within this type of investigation.
Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 30(3)
To confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police have used informants with previous investigations and criminal convictions in specific investigations would provide sensitive information that would undermine policing and investigations.
Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial - Section 31(3)
Confirming or denying whether Dyfed-Powys Police holds information relevant to this request the public would see where public funds have been spent and allow the Police service to appear more open and transparent. Dyfed-Powys Police is committed to openness and transparency with the general public. When a request for information is made, it is correct that the police make appropriate information available to the general public. The provision of information, through confirming or denying whether information relevant to this request is held would accordingly, reinforce our commitment to be an open and transparent organisation.
Factors Against Confirmation or Denial - Section 31(3)
By confirming or denying whether information is held could compromise law enforcement tactics which would hinder the prevention and detection of crime and impact on police resources which may need to be increased to reassure the public and protect the surrounding community. This would result in more risk to the public and consequently require the use of more police resources.
Overall Balance Test:
When balancing the Public Interest Test we have to consider whether the information, if held, should be released into the public domain. Arguments need to be weighed against each other.
The security of the country is of paramount importance and Dyfed-Powys will not divulge whether information is or is not held if to do so would undermine National Security, our law enforcement functions or the investigative process. Whilst it is recognised that there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed by various groups or individuals, there is a very strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of police investigations and operations in this highly sensitive area.
As much as there is public interest in knowing that policing activity is appropriate and balanced this will only be overridden in exceptional circumstances. Areas of interest to the police are sensitive to the extent that they reveal local intelligence. To confirm or deny the existence of the requested information, would allow interested parties to gain an upper hand and awareness of policing decisions used during investigations, leading to an increase of harm to either the investigation itself, and the subject of the investigation.
Whilst to confirm or deny that information is held, would reassure the public that any operation had been or was being properly conducted and allow for a greater understanding of how information has been gathered, this could undermine the role and effectiveness of any future operations. Any disclosure of information, if held, which has the potential to jeopardise an operation/investigation, is therefore likely to prejudice law enforcement.
Therefore, at this time Dyfed-Powys Police have determined that confirmation or denial that any other information is held relating to CHIS and Palestine Protest groups would not be in the public interest.
However, this should not be taken as necessarily indicating that any information that would meet your request exists or does not exist.
(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 12/11/2025)
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