Chorus software licences 474/2026

FOI Reference: 474/2026

Request

1. Licences in Force

Please confirm how many licences for Chorus Analyse, Chorus Intelligence and CIS are currently in force within Dyfed Powys Police, and identify the number of licences held for each product.

2. Contract Value

Please provide the annual value of the contract or contracts associated with these licences. If this information is already held for publication, please also confirm where the contract award or transparency information is published in accordance with the applicable public procurement transparency requirements.

3. Contract Expiry

Please confirm the expiry date of the current contract or contracts for these products, including any extension options that remain available and whether any such extensions have been exercised.

4. Procurement Route and Future Intentions

Please provide any recorded information held by Dyfed Powys Police which explains the procurement route used for the current Cell Site Analysis software arrangements, including any rationale for not undertaking a competitive procurement exercise to date. Please also confirm whether there are any current recorded plans or future procurement intentions in relation to this software requirement.

Response

Section 1 of the Freedom of information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities.  Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at s1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified within a request is held.  The second duty at s1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.  Where exemptions are relied upon Section 17 of the FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which:

a) states that fact,

b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and

c) state (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.

Dyfed-Powys Police can neither confirm nor deny that information is held relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(2) National Security

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Sections 24 and 31 are prejudice based qualified exemptions and there is a requirement to articulate the harm that would be caused in confirming or denying that any other information is held as well as carrying out a public interest test.

Evidence of Harm:

Every effort should be made to release information under Freedom of Information.  However a FOIA response is considered to be a release to the world, as once the information is published the public authority have no control over what use is made of that information.

The Police Service is charged with enforcing the law, preventing and detecting crime and protecting the communities they serve.  In order to achieve these objectives all forces utilise Information Technology essential to front line services. Disclosure of information regarding certain IT services, capabilities and security infrastructure in concert with any formal acknowledgement of strategic deficiency, would reveal intricacies of those systems thereby highlighting vulnerabilities and compromising individual force information assurance. 

To confirm or deny whether information is held in relation to whether specific software is used by Dyfed-Powys Police would reveal sensitive operational capabilities, around the force’s network infrastructure.   It would place the network infrastructure at increased risk of attack, This could enable individuals with malicious intent to identify and target suppliers with cyber-attacks, potentially resulting in disruption or denial of service. Such interference may impact the ability of police forces to gather intelligence effectively, thereby prejudicing the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders.

This type of information would be extremely beneficial to offenders, including terrorists and terrorist organisations. It is vitally important that information sharing takes place to support counter-terrorism measures in the fight to deprive terrorist networks of their ability to commit crime. To confirm or deny information is held about such software, would be extremely useful to those involved in terrorist activity as it would enable them to map vulnerable information security databases. These risks are all the more relevant when requests are make to multiple forces as disclosure would enable a geographical picture to be drawn up by those individuals who are intent on ‘hacking’ police systems.

Public Interest Test

Section 24(2) National Security

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that information is held:

The public are entitled to know how public funds are spent and how resources are distributed within an area of policing. To confirm or deny whether information is held, would enable the general public to hold the police to account on the appropriate security measures and systems they have are in place, and enable improved public debate into this subject in terms of the use of public funds.  

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that information is held:

Security measures are put in place to protect the community we serve. As evidenced within the harm to confirm information is held would highlight to terrorists and individuals intent on carrying out criminal activity vulnerabilities within the police service. 

Taking into account the current security climate within the United Kingdom, no information (such as the citing of an exemption which confirms information pertinent to this request is held, or conversely, stating ‘no information is held’) which may aid a terrorist should be disclosed. To what extent this information may aid a terrorist is unknown, but it is clear that it will have an impact on a force’s ability to monitor terrorist activity.

Irrespective of what information is or isn’t held, the public entrust the Police Service to make appropriate decisions with regard to their safety and protection and the only way of reducing risk is to be cautious with what is placed into the public domain.

The cumulative effect of terrorists gathering information from various sources would be even more impactful when linked to other information gathered from various sources about terrorism. The more information disclosed over time will give a more detailed account of the tactical infrastructure of not only a force area, but also the country as a whole.

Any incident that results from such a disclosure would, by default, affect National Security.

Section 31(3) Law Enforcement

Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming that information is held:

Confirming whether or not information exists, would lead to a better informed public and may encourage individuals to provide intelligence in order to reduce the risk of police networks being hacked.

Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) neither confirming nor denying that information is held:

Confirmation or denial information is held in relation to specific software would undermine current and future technological integrity, which in turn compromises the force’s mandate to protect the safety of the public through effective policing practices. Confirming or denying information is held is intelligence to those who would wish to exploit vulnerabilities in the service and compromise of force IT systems. Ultimately this negatively affects law enforcement capabilities, hinders the prevention and detection of crime and risks public safety.

Confirmation or denial that information is held would suggest the police take their responsibility to protect information and information systems from unauthorised access, destruction, etc., dismissively and inappropriately.

(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 02/07/2026)