Malicious communications & online harassment 400/2026

FOI Reference: 400/2026

Request:

Following the Freedom of Information Act, please provide me the following:

1. The number of recorded incidents in each of the past three years involving:

• • Offensive communications
  • Malicious communications
  • Online harassment

2. The number that resulted in:

• • Arrest
  • Charge

AND

3. The number of staff assigned to social media monitoring, open-source intelligence (OSINT), or online investigations

4. The annual cost of these teams

5. Any software platforms used (e.g. monitoring tools) and the cost of such tools

 

Response 1:

I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the information requested, the details of which are as follows:

Please note: There is no such offence as ‘offensive communications’

Please also note: The figures provided for online harassment below relate to instances in which a cyber-dependant/enabled flag/box has been ticked on an harassment offence.  Consequently there may be instances in which the cyber-dependant/enabled flag/box was incorrectly ticked or not ticked at all. However, to answer this accurately would exceed the 18 hour time limit as all harassment offences would need to be reviewed accordingly.

Year	Malicious communications	Online Harassment
2023*	904	392
2024	894	1017
2025	739	1286
2026**	244	412
(* from 15/05/23 onwards)
(** till 11/05/26)

Response 2:

I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the information requested, the details of which are as follows:

	Malicious communications		Online Harassment
Year	Arrested	Charged	Arrested	Charged
2023*	47	13	15	0
2024	47	13	42	9
2025	44	12	77	10
2026**	20	4	20	7
(* from 15/05/23 onwards)
(** till 11/05/26)

Response 3&4:

Information to answer these questions is not recorded in a way which would enable Dyfed Powys police to provide an accurate or reliable response. Staff who undertake social media monitoring, OSINT or online investigative activity do so as part of a broader range of duties, and the level of activity will vary in line with operational demand. Any figures, if collated, would represent only a partial and potentially misleading snapshot of activity.

Similarly, associated costs are not separately disaggregated for these functions and are incorporated within wider operational budgets. It would not be possible to isolate a specific annual cost attributable solely to these activities without interpretation or estimation, which falls outside the scope of the Act.

The Freedom of Information Act provides access to recorded information held at the time of the request; it does not require the creation of new information or the collation of data from multiple sources where no reliable dataset exists. To the extent that any information may exist in a fragmented or locally held form, it would not be possible to extract a complete or reliable dataset, and any partial disclosure would not provide an accurate reflection of overall resourcing or activity.

Response 5:

I can confirm that Dyfed-Powys Police does hold the information requested, however some of that information has been exempted by virtue of the following exemptions:

Section 24(1) National Security

Section 31(1)(a)(b) Law Enforcement

Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at Section 1(1) (a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified in a request is held. The second duty at Section 1(1) (b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held.

Where exemptions are relied upon section 17 of FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which:

a) States that fact

b) Specifies the exemption(s) in question and

c) State (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies

Section 31 exemption is a prejudice-based qualified exemption, Section 24 is a qualified class based exemption. In respect of both exemptions there is a requirement to carry out a HARM Test in respect of such information and there is a requirement to carry out a Public Interest Test in order to establish whether the public interest in maintaining the exemption may be outweighed by a wider public benefit in disclosure.

Harm

Any disclosure under FOIA is considered a release to the public at large. Under the Act, we cannot, and do not, request the motives of an applicant. Whilst the vast majority of requests are made legitimately, disclosure must be considered in terms of the wider impact.

Disclosure in this case would be likely to cause operational harm and prejudice the ability of the force to prevent and detect crime and apprehend offenders. Disclosing the names of specific OSINT tools, software platforms or suppliers would reveal detailed insight into the resources and techniques used to monitor and respond to online activity. This would enable individuals or groups intent on causing disruption, committing crime or avoiding detection to better understand policing capabilities and adjust their behaviour accordingly.

Such disclosure would allow informed individuals to identify both force-level and, when aggregated, national capability strengths, gaps and operational focus. This could be exploited to evade detection, undermine investigative activity, or target perceived vulnerabilities, ultimately placing members of the public at greater risk.

In addition, disclosure of the costs associated with such tools or platforms would itself reveal sensitive information about the scale, sophistication and prioritisation of online intelligence gathering. Even where tools are not explicitly named, financial information could allow inferences to be drawn about the type and extent of capabilities in use. When combined with other information already in the public domain, this contributes to a cumulative (“mosaic”) effect, enabling a more detailed understanding of policing capabilities than would otherwise be available.

The risk is further increased where both the identity of tools and associated costs are disclosed together, as this allows a more complete and accurate picture of operational capability to be derived.

Furthermore, any information that may indicate the circumstances in which such tools are deployed, or the extent to which they are relied upon, would be likely to compromise ongoing or future investigations. This would undermine law enforcement activity and reduce the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. The UK threat level is currently assessed as “SEVERE”, meaning that an attack is highly likely. It is well established that policing relies on intelligence gathering to counter serious and organised crime and terrorism. Disclosure of information relating to online intelligence gathering capabilities would provide those intent on causing harm with valuable insight into police methods and potential limitations, increasing the risk of such activity.

This detrimental effect is amplified when similar information is disclosed across multiple forces. A number of disclosures, when pieced together, would enable a broader mapping of capabilities, systems and suppliers across the UK. This would provide a clearer intelligence picture to those seeking to undermine policing or target critical capabilities. Any disclosure which undermines the operational integrity of these activities will adversely affect public safety and have a negative impact on both law enforcement and national security.

Public Interest Test

Factors favouring disclosure (Sections 24 and 31)

There is a clear public interest in transparency and accountability in relation to policing activity. Disclosure would provide reassurance to the public that the police service is making appropriate use of technology to tackle crime and protect communities. It would also contribute to a more informed public debate about the use of surveillance-type capabilities and the proportionality of such measures.

In addition, there is a public interest in understanding how public funds are spent, particularly in relation to technology and specialist capabilities.

Factors against disclosure (Sections 24 and 31)

Disclosure would be likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime by revealing sensitive details about the tools, techniques and capabilities used in online investigations. This would allow criminals and other malicious actors to adapt their behaviour to avoid detection, thereby undermining law enforcement activity.

Revealing both the type of tools used and the level of investment in those tools would provide a clear indication of operational capability, priorities and limitations. This would increase the risk of those capabilities being circumvented or exploited.

There is also a strong public interest in safeguarding the effectiveness of policing tactics and ensuring that investigations are not compromised. The Police Service relies on a range of overt and covert methods, and disclosure of such information would reduce their effectiveness.

Furthermore, the cumulative impact of disclosure, particularly when combined with information released by other forces, would be likely to provide a more comprehensive intelligence picture. This would increase the risk to national security by exposing capability gaps or vulnerabilities which could be exploited.

Balance Test:

The security of the public is of paramount importance. Whilst there is a recognised public interest in transparency and accountability, this must be balanced against the risk of harm caused by disclosure. In this case, disclosure of information relating to the tools, platforms and associated costs used for online intelligence gathering would be likely to prejudice law enforcement and, when considered in the wider context, adversely affect national security. It would reveal operational capability, highlight potential vulnerabilities and undermine the effectiveness of policing activity. Therefore, it is our view that the balance of the public interest favours maintaining the exemptions under Sections 24(1) and 31(1) of the Act.

 

(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 22/06/2026)

Os oes angen y wybodaeth yma arnoch yn Gymraeg, cysylltwch â: [email protected] If you require this information in Welsh, please contact: [email protected]