Royalty protection provisions 235/24
FOI Reference: 235/2024
Request:
1. Does Dyfed-Powys Constabulary have enough money to protect the Prince and Princess of Wales when doing their duties or simply visiting the Principality?
2. Does the Force need more money to provide necessary adequate protection?
3. Has the Force been boosted with extra funding to ensure the Prince and Princess are safe?
4. Is the Force concerned that it does not have enough money to provide the best protection for the Prince and Princess?
5. Is the Force entirely happy that it can provide enough officers to ensure the Prince and Princess of Wales are properly protected at all times?
6. Would the Force like to be in a position to provide more officers to guarantee the Prince and Princess of Wales are safe, and properly protected at all times?
7. The Force refused to confirm that it had enough money to guarantee the Prince and Princess of Wales would receive the best protection when carrying out duties or simply paying a courtesy visit?
Response 1 – 7:
Section 1 of the Freedom of information Act 2000 (FOIA) places two duties on public authorities. Unless exemptions apply, the first duty at s1(1)(a) is to confirm or deny whether the information specified within a request is held. The second duty at s1(1)(b) is to disclose information that has been confirmed as being held. Where exemptions are relied upon Section 17 of the FOIA requires that we provide the applicant with a notice which:
a) states that fact,
b) specifies the exemption(s) in question and
c) state (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies.
Dyfed-Powys Police can neither confirm nor deny that information is held relevant to your request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 24(2) - National Security
Section 31(3) - Law Enforcement
Section 38(2) - Health and Safety
Section 40(5) - Personal Information
Sections 24, 31 & 38 are qualified exemptions and as such there is a requirement to articulate the harm and conduct a test of the public interest in confirmation or denial. Section 40 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case
Section 24(2) - National Security
Harm in complying with s1(1)(a) – to confirm or not whether information is held
Confirmation or denial that information is held in respect of this request would result in harm to the national security of the United Kingdom. To confirm or deny that information is held relating to costs associated with the protection that may be afforded to Members of the Royal Family would provide those intent on committing acts of terrorism with valuable information as to the level of resistance they might expect to encounter with undertaking such an act. Confirmation or denial that information is held would also give valuable tactical information to those who seek to harm such figures.
Confirmation or denial that information is held might assist a potential terrorist in planning an attack on a Member of the Royal Family. This would threaten the prime institution of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements, and thus the nation’s security.
Factors favouring complying with s(1)(1)(a) confirming that information is held
To confirm whether or not information exists relating to costs/expenditure by the police on behalf of the taxpayer can enhance the accountability of the service and its standing within an open and democratic society. Although a sensitive issue, such openness can also enhance understanding of national security issues. The public have both a right and an interest in participating in the debates surrounding national security issues, and knowledge of where money is being spent would enhance their ability to participate meaningfully in such discussions.
Factors against complying with s1(1)(a) neither confirming nor denying that information is held
The fact that there are a number of groups that would seek to harm the national security of the United Kingdom is generally accepted not just by the Intelligence and security services, but also by the media and the public. Persons such as Members of The Royal Family, who undertake constitutional and representative duties - both nationally and internationally, therefore provide a target for such persons. Groups planning such attacks are known to conduct extensive research into the opposition they might face. To confirm or deny that information exists might enhance their capability. Additionally, it could lead to the need to review tactics, provide extra staff and additional costs. Confirmation or denial that information exists therefore would be detrimental from a national security perspective.
Balancing Test.
When considering the confirmation or denial that information is held in relation to this request, we must weigh the public interest in allowing access to such information against the harm that might be caused by its supply. To confirm or deny that information is held would allow extremists to gauge the level of protection that may be afforded to Members of The Royal Family providing anyone intent on committing acts of terrorism with intelligence as to the level of police resistance that they may encounter. This would hinder the ability of law enforcement bodies to protect these individuals and would clearly not be in the public interest.
It is obviously desirable that Dyfed-Powys Police accounts for how it spends public money, particularly at a time of constraints in public spending. Articles in the media and comments attributed to members of the public indicate a growing interest/concern in this subject area.
However, the threat to national security from terrorist groups is real and ever present and would be made more likely to be realised were it confirmed or denied that information is held regarding the costs of protection arrangements. There is also a strong likelihood that the confirmation or denial that information is held would reveal which individual law enforcement authorities believe to be most at risk of terrorist attack. The ability to identify any types of intelligence that law enforcement authorities might rely on would clearly not be in the wider public interest.
All UK police forces have a duty to fulfil their national security functions. The confirmation or denial that information is held would increase the risk to the safety of Members of the Royal Family and is inextricably linked to national security, any attacks on these individuals would be an attack on the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and its constitutional arrangements. Therefore, it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test for neither confirming nor denying that information is held is made out. No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.
Section 31(3) Law Enforcement
Harm in complying with s1(1)(a) – to confirm or not whether information is held
To confirm or deny that information is held may prejudice the prevention and detection of crime. Members of the Royal Family are at times the target of criminal and fixated elements and terrorist threats, persons wishing to cause harm to certain individuals. To confirm or deny that information is held would inevitably compromise the safety of those being targeted by enabling an assessment to be made of whether any security arrangements may be in place. It might also reveal policing tactics for other VIPs, something which might undermine protection arrangements generally.
Those planning attacks are known to use a wide range of resources, including press reports and physical reconnaissance. Reducing the information available or making it more difficult to acquire is obviously desirable.
It also follows that any heightened risk to individuals, whether they are or are not in receipt of protective security arrangements, represents a similar risk to a member of any organisation (e.g. the police) providing protection. Any physical attack on any person, regardless of whether they are a Member of the Royal Family or not, is a crime and therefore where confirmation or denial that information is held would harm their safety (or that of any other person) Section 31(3) is engaged.
Factors favouring complying with s1(1)(a) confirming information is held
The public have a genuine interest in what the police do and how they do it. Their interest is legitimate and to be encouraged within a democratic society where policing is by consent.
Public accountability for the use of resources and taxpayers’ money, and a willingness to be transparent and open are desirable characteristics in all public authorities.
The interest in confirming or denying that information is held relating to costs regarding protection is therefore to be expected, especially when there is some concern as to whether such expenditure is appropriate and justified.
Factors against complying with s1(1)(a) neither confirming nor denying that information is held
Confirmation or denial that information is held would provide terrorists, criminals or the fixated with information as to the levels of protection that may be afforded to Members of The Royal Family. This would not be desirable as it would provide anyone intent on committing an act of terrorism with vital intelligence as to the level of resistance that they may encounter. Confirmation or denial that information is held would augment that already available, making the task of prevention more difficult and the chance of attack more likely. This would hinder the ability of the law enforcement bodies to perform their public protection role and would clearly not be in the public interest.
One of the primary objectives of Dyfed-Powys Police is the prevention of crime. To confirm or deny that information is held might increase the likelihood of a crime being committed which is not in the public interest.
Balancing Test
When considering whether the confirmation or denial that information is held in relation to this request Dyfed-Powys Police have to weigh the potential benefits against the harm that might be caused.
Balancing the public right to know and Dyfed-Powys Police’s duty to account against the potential damage to its present and future operational capability in this case favours neither confirming nor denying that information is held. The terrorist, fixated and criminal threats are real. To confirm or deny that information is held would increase the likelihood of terrorism or any other criminal activity places the public at risk, as well as members of the law enforcement bodies and Members of The Royal Family. There is no public interest in confirming or denying that information is held where it would increase the risk to public safety.
Section 38(2) - Health and Safety
Harm in complying with s1(1)(a) – to confirm or not whether information is held
Confirmation or denial that information is held would endanger the physical health and safety of Members of The Royal Family and their Households, the police and members of the public.
The possibility of a mosaic effect being established whereby information that has already been disclosed could be matched with unofficial information to form assessments of possible security measures is a real danger. The confirmation or denial that information is held may also reveal policing tactics regarding Members of the Royal Family and could be used to form part of a wider assessment of levels of protection afforded to others not subject to this request. The confirmation or denial that information is held would therefore also be to the detriment of another who may not be in receipt of similar levels of protection.
Budgets are finite and staffing levels directly related to the money that is provided. Over time it is possible to determine from snippets of information released legitimately or inadvertently, likely police protection tactics.
Factors favouring complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming information is held
To confirm or deny that information is held would provide an insight in how the Home Office and police work and would improve public understanding of policing decisions. It would enable the public to determine whether policing arrangements are appropriate and would help with public scrutiny of an important Public Authority. It may help to remove speculation, rumour and conjecture.
Factors against complying with Section 1(1)(a) confirming or denying that information is held
Confirmation or denial that information is held would be likely to increase the vulnerability of Members of The Royal Family, the public and our officers and/or impact adversely upon our ability to provide a safe and secure environment. To confirm or deny that information is held would also increase the risk to police as collateral damage in the event of an attack. All people are entitled to live and work without a threat of violence directed against them. It is not in the public interest for members of the public to be placed in position of vulnerability by confirming or denying that information is held in respect specific individuals.
To confirm or deny that information is held might lead to policing tactics having to be altered, staffing levels increased and costs rising, which are adverse effects definitely not in the public interest.
Balancing Test
After weighing up the competing interests it has been determined that confirming or denying that information is held would not be in the public interest. Also, the benefit that would result from confirming or denying that information is held does not outweigh neither confirming nor denying that information is held. Therefore, it is our opinion that for these issues the balance test for neither confirming nor denying that information is held is made out. No inference can be taken from this refusal that information does or does not exist.
Section 40(5) – Personal Information:
The duty to neither confirm nor deny under this section of the Act arises if confirmation as to whether the requested information is or isn’t held would breach any of the data protection principles contained within Part 3 - Chapter 2 of the Data Protection Act 2018. Under Section 34 within Chapter 2 “The Controller in relation to personal data is responsible for and must be able to demonstrate, compliance with” Chapter 2. Such information would not be confirmed as held under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 unless there is a strong public interest. One of the main differences between the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 2018 is that any information released under FOI is released into the public domain, not just the individual requesting the information and disclosure under the Act must be made with that in mind. As such, any release that identifies an individual through releasing their personal data, even third party personal data is exempt.
Personal data is defined under Section 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 as:
“(2) ‘Personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual (subject to subsection (14)(c)).
(3) ‘Identifiable living individual’ means a living individual who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to—
- An identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data or an online identifier, or
(b) One or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of the individual.”
All members of the public including those employed by the force have an intrinsic right to privacy and these rights are protected by virtue of the Human Rights Act, the Data Protection Act 2018 and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and a public authority must not interfere with that right. Any release of the information subject to the exemption is likely to compromise those rights.
Data Protection Act 2018
Part 3 – Law Enforcement – Chapter 2 Principles Section 35
The first data protection principle:
“(1) The first data protection principle is that the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes must be lawful and fair.”
General Data Protection Regulation
Article 5 of the GDPR – ‘Principles relating to processing of personal data’ provides:
“1. ‘Personal data’ shall be
(a) Processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency);
(b) Collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest…
2. The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’).”
Dyfed-Powys Police would not want to confirm nor deny whether any information is held, relevant to the request, if confirmation/denial could potentially identify an individual. In this case, any information that may or may not be held relevant to the request could potentially contain personal data of identifiable individual(s) and any disclosure, by citing an exemption or stating no information held would clearly breach the Data Protection Act as a consequence I am satisfied that Section 40(5) Personal Information exemption is applicable. In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this represents a Refusal Notice for this particular request. No inference can be taken from this refusal that the information you have requested does or does not exist.
(This is a response under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and disclosed on 03/04/24)